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social pressure on registered inactive voters. This study advances the growing body of
scholarly research that examines the influence of appeals on registrants with varying
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arguably, no other incentives have encouraged these non-voters to cast a ballot, we can
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INTRODUCTION
From the local aldermen to state and federal legislators to the president, eligible
voters in the United States collectively choose their representatives. Elections are a vital and
obvious way for voters to participate in the democratic process and voting is perhaps the least
intrusive and low-cost way individuals influence their government. Citizen participation is at
the heart of democracy. Just as important is the equal consideration of the interests of each
citizen (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Democracy is recognized as a normative good
because citizens directly participate in their government. Plainly stated, citizen participation
is necessary for a democracy to function properly. Elections give Americans “primary
control on the government” (Hamilton and Madison 2008, Federalist 51), and acts of
political participation are viewed as central to national identity in democratic societies and
constitute what is seen as normative behavior for a “good' citizen" (Huddy and Khatib 2007).
Specifically, high voter turnout is a normative good arguably because more citizens
are sharing their interests with their elected representatives. However, when turnout is low
the concerns of all citizens are not being heard equally by public officials. As a result,
citizens abstaining from exercising their right to vote lose a voice in government and
relinquish control over government activities. In response, elected officials learn to target
only those who participate in the electoral process. When studying why individuals abstain
from voting in primary elections, Hill and Kousser (2016) state that candidates often target
only those they expect to participate in the primary, which usually means those who have
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voted in past primaries.1 Randomized mobilization experiments demonstrate that
canvassing and letters increase the turnout of voters whom campaigns target (Gerber and
Green 2000; Gerber Green and Larimer 2008; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003). The
degree of the mobilization depends upon the extent of targeting conducted by campaigns
(Hill and Kousser 2016). In other words, a common campaign strategy is to target voters who
will support the party’s candidates and causes.
In practice, political elites may begin to actively ignore the interests of those who do
not participate in the political process and consequently become less accountable.
Encouraging non-voters to engage in the political process is important to giving them a voice
in government. Scholars have identified a number of get out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts that
mobilize voters to “turn out.” One particular strategy, applying social pressure, is the focus of
the research presented in this paper.
Social Pressure and Behavior
To date, substantial research provides evidence that social pressure influences a
variety of behavior. Studies have documented the effects of social pressure on recycling
(Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000; Schulz 1999), donating to a public good (Whatley et al.
1999), and abiding by fairness norms in bargaining scenarios (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith
1996). People are attentive to behavior modeled by others and internalize norms readily,
especially when those around them provide clear signals about what types of behavior are
considered appropriate (Scheff 2000). Furthermore, surveillance increases the likelihood of

1

Hill and Kousser (2016) learned that ignoring registrants without a previous record of primary turnout is a
common strategy according to candidates running for statewide office in California, 2014.
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compliant behavior (Posner and Rasmusen 1999; Rind and Benjamin 1994). Compliance is
more probable when it is publicly visible (Whatley et al. 1999). The influence of social
pressure also extends to voting behavior.
Social pressure has been shown to positively influence voter participation. There are
two primary theories used to explain why individuals choose to vote. First, according to the
intrinsic incentive hypothesis, voting is regarded as a citizen’s responsibility (Blais 2000) and
incorporates a sense of civic duty as an explanation for voter turnout (Campbell, Gurin, and
Miller 1954; Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). In other words, individuals feel good
about voting and participating in the political process and consequently turn out. The second
explanation rests on extrinsic incentives whereby individuals vote because they worry about
what others will think of them if they do not. According to Harbaugh (1996), widespread
over-reporting of voting in surveys signals the potential importance of extrinsic incentives.
This viewpoint is supported by the social psychology literature, which emphasizes that
behavior varies depending on whether people perceive their actions to be public (Cialdini and
Goldstein 2004; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Lerner and Tetlock 1999).
In addition to the effects of social pressure on voter turnout, scholars have also
studied whether the mobilization effect of social pressure varies by delivery method and
message content. From a political campaign perspective, social pressure is more effective
than conventional campaign mailers or non-partisan direct mail (Cardy 2005; Gerber, Green
and Green 2003; Ramirez 2005) and door-to-door canvassing (Green, Gerber and Nickerson
2003). Interestingly, Davenport (2010) finds that applying social pressure via door-to-door
canvassing positively influences voter turnout. Canvassing with a standard GOTV message is
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effective, but the effect is stronger when the potential voter is provided with his or her vote
history (Davenport 2010). At the same time, however, not all forms of social pressure have
the desired effect of encouraging political participation (Schwenzfeier 2014). Investigating
the influence of social pressure and issue advocacy, Schwenzfeier (2014) finds compelling
evidence that combining social pressure with issue-based language significantly decreases
turn out among targeted voters. Schwenzfeier (2014) offers two possible explanations for her
findings: direct mail backlash and reactance.
Matland and Murray (2013) conducted a survey experiment with a mailer that had a
civic duty message combined with either a hypothetical voting history (treatment) or no
voting history (control). The authors found evidence for direct mail backlash effects and
concluded that social pressure mail causes increased negative affect and makes individuals
less likely to support a candidate, but they do not report findings that the mailers made
subjects less likely to turn out to vote. Reactance occurs when an individual feels his or her
freedom to make a decision is being infringed upon by an outside force. Furthermore,
reactance can reduce compliance with the behavior that is being promoted and can cause
negative affect toward the sender of the message (Bensley and Wu 1991; Brehm 1966; Miller
et al. 2006; Reich and Robertson 1979).
Moreover, social pressure is enhanced by personal associations. Individuals are more
likely to vote if friends and co-workers intend to vote (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). In
addition, social and professional groups play an important role in the individual voting
process (Schram and van Winden; 1991Uhlaner 1989). Voters often do not act in isolation
but as part of groups with shared interests and where civic obligation is the baseline for
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voting (Uhlaner 1989). Some of the consumption benefits that arise from voting are
collective benefits received by the group (Uhlaner 1989). The “follow the leader” or
“bandwagon effect” that can result from a group dynamic can lead to an increase in voter
turnout (Dhillon and Peralta 2002). Studies have shown evidence that political parties
function as one of these groups and can help drive increased turnout (Cox and Munger 1989;
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). Group participation offers a
degree of social pressure that can mobilize members to turn out (Geys 2006).
Voting procedure is another context in which the influence of social pressure has
been studied. Scholars have shown that “vote by mail” procedures influence voter turnout. In
jurisdictions where mail-in ballots are the only option, voting costs are minimal.
Subsequently, voter turnout may increase among those who are predisposed to vote (Karp
and Banducci 2000). However, Funk (2010) demonstrates that voting by mail negatively
affects voter participation in low-populated communities. Individuals in smaller communities
are more likely to frequent the polling place on election day and thus are more susceptible to
experience social incentives or pressure. In other words, individuals in these communities
have an extrinsic incentive to be more politically active. Funk (2010) argues that in small
communities especially, social pressure associated with voting in person drives turnout.
Under these circumstances, voting by mail diminishes the social pressure effect as voting is
no longer a public activity. The extrinsic incentive is eliminated and turnout decreases as a
result.
A common strategy highlighted in voting and political participation literature is to
target active or semi-active voters. In other words, these studies examine the impact of
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different messages and delivery methods on individuals with some propensity to vote. As is a
common strategy within political campaigns, much of this research relies on identifying
individuals who are likely voters and then proceeds to estimate the effects of political
mobilization or the simple act of being asked to vote. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995)
identified three reasons individuals participate in the political process: 1. access to resources,
2. predisposition to political engagement, and 3. invitations for involvement or mobilization.
Mobilization requests come from formal institutions (e.g. political parties, workplace,
voluntary associations or churches) and through informal relationships such as family,
friends and neighbors. Requests may even come from strangers.
To my knowledge, no study to date has conducted a field experiment to test the
mobilization effect of social pressure on registered inactive voters. This study advances the
growing body of scholarly research that examines the influence of appeals on registrants with
varying propensities to vote by empirically testing the effect of social pressure on non-voters.
Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) argue that low-propensity voters can be effectively
mobilized only in high-turnout elections. Furthermore, face-to-face mobilization is better at
stimulating turnout among low-propensity voters in prominent elections. In subsequent
research, Arceneaux, Mullin and Kousser (2012) find that a door-to-door mobilization
campaign has a larger effect on in-person voters than on registrants assigned to cast mail
ballots, but only among individuals whose voting behavior is most likely to be shaped by
extrinsic social rewards. In analyzing 24 ﬁeld experiments, Enos, Fowler and Vavreck (2014)
ﬁnd that two thirds of GOTV experiments mobilized high-propensity voters to a greater
degree than low-propensity voters, further aggravating the participation gap.
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We test the effect of social pressure treatments on registered non-voters. Since,
arguably, no other incentives have encouraged these non-voters to cast a ballot in the
previous ten elections, we can estimate the value that social pressure has on encouraging
voting behavior. In addition, we can gain a better understanding of which social pressure
strategy is successful for encouraging registered non-voters to become engaged in the
electoral process. This research provides the most promise in terms of remedial policies or,
more narrowly, winning electoral strategies. Does social pressure influence registered nonvoters? If so, is one strategy of social pressure more powerful for encouraging non-voters to
turnout? The remainder of this paper examines these questions.
Previous Studies
Although the influence of social pressure on voting behavior has long been an object
of laboratory experimentation, only recently has social pressure become the object of
experimental inquiry in a real-world setting. In the first large-scale field experiment, Gerber,
Green and Larimer (2008) demonstrate that social pressure positively influenced voter
turnout in the 2006 primary election in Michigan. Further, these authors find that as the
degree of social pressure increases, voter turnout increases. For example, the lowest form of
social pressure (Treatment 1) simply urged individuals to carry out their civic duty and vote;
in Treatment 4, presumed to be the most intense form of social pressure, subjects were told
that their vote history2 would be shared with their neighbors. In all, the increase in turnout

2

Voter history is the official public record of elections in which individuals cast a ballot. These records do not
show how someone voted, only whether an individual participated or abstained from a given election.
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amounted to a growth of 1.8% to 8.1% among the treatment groups and increasing with
turnout corresponding with heightened social pressure.
Building on the initial 2006 Michigan Primary Election experiment, Gerber, Green,
and Larimer (2010) investigated whether calling a voter’s attention to a past abstention or
vote has a greater effect on the decision to vote. This study was conducted prior to the
November 2007 Michigan municipal elections. The results closely approximate those found
in the Michigan 2006 primary and confirm that turn out responds to social pressure, with the
greatest increase in voter turnout reflective of the intensity of social pressure treatment (see
Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008).
Studies have also begun to explore whether different political contexts influence the
impact of social pressure on voter turnout. Specifically, Larimer (2009) reports mixed results
when studying whether the influence of social pressure changes with the competitiveness of
the election. Coding for the type of election on the ballot-- no contested races (mayor or city
council), mayoral contested only, city council contested only, and both contested (mayor and
city council-- Larimer (2009) finds that the social pressure treatment effects are consistent
with the prevailing evidence that social pressure treatments increase voter turnout regardless
of whether they are used in the context of competitive or uncompetitive elections. Building
on these earlier studies, Hill and Kousser (2016) study the influence of social pressure
treatments on non-primary voters. In their field experiment, Hill and Kousser (2016) identify
voters who have a propensity to participate in general elections but abstain from primary
elections. The results provide compelling evidence that social pressure can influence voters
typically not engaged in the party’s nominating process to turn out for primary elections.
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The current study advances the existing research by targeting individuals who have
not participated in any election from 2011-2015, or ten elections of varying importance,
including the 2012 presidential, 2014 congressional midterm and gubernatorial elections to
name just a few. To facilitate a comparison and to advance our understanding of social
pressure certain aspects of the Gerber, Green, and Larimer studies (2008, 2010) have been
adapted. Specifically, this study focuses on registered non-voters in the 2016 Presidential
Primary Election.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Considering the extant literature, this experiment tests three primary hypotheses:
•

H1 – Registered non-voters who receive social pressure treatments will turn out at
a higher rate than registered non-voters receiving no social pressure treatment.

•

H2 – As the intensity of social pressure increases, voter turnout will also increase.

•

H3 – The largest increase in voter turnout will occur where the social pressure is
the greatest (T4 – Neighbor).
Experimental Setting

This experiment studies voter turnout in the 2016 Presidential Primary Election in the
state of Illinois. The 10th Congressional District was chosen because it is a marginal
congressional district.3 In other words, it is a competitive, partisan swing district that could
impact the partisan makeup of the U.S. House of Representatives. According to Morris
Fiorina (1989), the marginal congressman provides the means by which changes in the
popular sentiments receive expression in the halls of the Capitol (p. 14). By comparison a
safe district is one in which representatives continue to hold their seats until voluntary

3

Marginal districts refer to congressional districts not firmly in the camp of one party or the other. Districts in
which candidates win between 50-55 % of the total vote are considered marginal (Fiorina 1989, p. 9).
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retirement or moral indiscretion jeopardizes their strong hold on the district (Fiorina 1989, p.
14). In the recent past, marginal districts have accounted for the bulk of the change in
membership in Congress (Mayhew 1974). In 2010, 2012 and 2014 the successful candidate
in the 10th Congressional District won with a narrow margin of victory and the seat has
consistently changed partisan hands in each of these elections. Although it was impossible to
know the outcome of the 2016 General Election at the time of this experiment, the Illinois
10th Congressional District changed partisan hands from Republican to Democrat again in
November of 2016. It is clear that the 10th Congressional District meets the definition of
“marginal district.” The fact that the 10th Congressional District is marginal combined with
the consistent partisan fluctuations makes it an important district to study.
Specifically, the sample in this experiment is compiled from the voter history data of
Cook County, Illinois, located in the 10th Congressional District. The 10th Congressional
District is located in portions of Lake and Cook Counties (Figure 1). Although combined
election results determine the outcome, county clerks in Illinois administer elections in their
respective jurisdictions. As a consequence, ballot structure can vary between the two
electoral jurisdictions. To control for ballot differences, we focus on the Cook County
portion of the 10th Congressional District. The Cook County portion of 10th CD is a
microcosm of the entire district and was evenly split4 in the 2010, 2012 and 2014
congressional elections (see aggregate vote shares by party in Table 1). In the 10th
Congressional District (Cook County portion) in 2010 the Republican candidate received

4

An “evenly split” congressional district is defined as a district that has no more than 6% difference in
Democrat and Republican voter turnout.
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54% of the vote and the Democrat candidate received 46% of the vote. In 2012, the
Democrat candidate received 51% of the vote and the Republican candidate received 49% of
the vote. In 2014, the Republican candidate received just over 50% of the vote and the
Democrat candidate received just under 50% of the vote.

13

Figure 1 - Illinois 10th Congressional District – US House of Representatives (Cook County)
Total Population: approximately 233,000
Registered Voters: approximately 98,000 (42% of population)
Registered Non-voters: approximately 27,000 (12% of population)
There are nine Illinois General Assembly districts that overlap this portion of the 10th US House
district resulting in nine different ballot offerings. The towns in each of these state legislative
districts are below:
Ballot 1: Des Plaines, Glenview, Morton
Grove, Niles, Park Ridge

Ballot 5: Des Plaines, Mr. Prospect, Prospect
Heights

Ballot 2: Glenview, Northbrook

Ballot 6: Des Plaines

Ballot 3: Glencoe, Northbrook, Winnetka

Ballot 7: Des Plaines, Glenview, Mt. Prospect,
Northbrook, Prospect Heights, Wheeling

Ballot 4: Des Plaines

Ballot 8: Glencoe, Northbrook
Ballot 9: Northbrook, Wheeling
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In short, if social pressure does influence non-voters to cast a ballot, the increase in voter
turnout could alter the outcome of the election as well as in other similarly tight electoral
races.

Democrat Candidate

Republican Candidate

2010 General Election
November 2, 2010

45.77% of the vote

54.23% of the vote

2012 General Election
November 6, 2012

51.02% of the vote

49.98% of the vote

2014 General Election
November 4, 2014

49.72 % of the vote

50.28% of the vote

2016 General Election
November 8, 2016

53.5% of the vote

46.5% of the vote

Table 1 - Illinois 10th Congressional District (Cook County) Partisan Vote Split
These vote percentages are for Cook County only. The partisan vote split in Lake County was
similar to the information shown here.
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Study Population
This experiment focuses on registered non-voters, defined as individuals who are
currently listed on the Cook County voter file but have not voted in the past ten elections.
The eligible but inactive voter in this study abstained from participating in the 2011, 2013
and 2015 consolidated local elections (primary and general), the 2014 primary and general
midterm elections and the 2012 presidential primary and general elections. Because the focus
of this research is to gain a better understanding of the potential to encourage electoral
participation, individuals who have voted in any of the last 10 elections are not considered.
Introducing social pressure has been shown to improve voter turnout of those who normally
vote by enhancing existing voter incentives. As stated previously, it is the study of non-voters
that provides the most promise in terms of remedial policies or, more narrowly, winning
electoral strategies. Registered non-voters have established that they are currently not
responding to any incentive to vote. Ironically, non-voters are typically ignored by political
campaigns and are not provided materials designed to “get them to the polls.” Yet, this group
represents the potential winning margin in low turnout or highly competitive elections.
Although the number fluctuates between elections, in April of 2015 the 10th
Congressional District (Cook County portion) had 89,629 registered voters. Of this number,
there were 26,765 registered voters who had not cast a ballot in the past ten elections. The
Cook County, Illinois, voter file is publicly available and contains basic residency and
demographic information for all registered individuals. In addition to mailing addresses, the
voter file contains the gender, age and voter history of each individual.
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Prior to randomly selecting a sample of 1,000 non-voters, individuals aged 18-23 were
removed from the sample pool as they were not eligible to vote during the entire specified time
period and thus do not meet the non-voter definition employed in this experiment. Put
differently, these individuals fail to meet the study’s criteria of non-voters as, owing to their
young age, they were ineligible to vote in all of the ten elections being considered here.
Furthermore, all registered non-voters 75 years of age or above were also eliminated in an
effort to account for a reduction in vote propensity that occurs among the oldest voters as a
consequence of infirmity or lack of mobility. Including the oldest age groups may skew
findings as the influence of social pressure may be altered if these individuals are physically
unable to vote.
After the age-ineligible individuals were removed from the voter database, the
remaining subjects were each assigned a random and unique number. The dataset was then
rank ordered by the random numbers (smallest to largest). The first 1,000 individuals were
selected for the experiment and then split into five equal groups of 200 representing the control
group and the four treatment groups. This experiment relied on bright yellow and green
postcards as the delivery method of the social pressure treatments. Utilizing postcards to
deliver a standard get-out-the-vote (GOTV) message (Arceneaux, Kousser, and Mullin 2012)
and social pressure treatments (Murray and Matland 2014) is a common practice in field
experiment studies. This delivery method was chosen to quickly catch the attention of the
subjects who do not typically engage in the political process. For individuals with little to no
propensity to vote, pamphlets or letters could go unnoticed and unread. The postcards were
sent to treatment participants by first class mail 10 days prior to the March 15, 2016, primary
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election. Returned postcard delivery revealed that the number of subjects in each group was
reduced slightly based on common postal issues such as incorrect address or residence change.
A total of 68 were returned as undeliverable. As shown in Table 2, the amount of returned mail
was similar across all four treatment groups.

Social Pressure Treatment Groups
T1

T2

T3

T4

Control

Civic Duty1

Hawthorne2

Self-Mailing3

Neighbor4

Gender Female

58%

52%

58%

51%

46%

Male

42%

48%

42%

49%

54%

Mean Age

47

44

45

44

43

N=932

N=200

N=183

N=185

N=186

N=178

Table 2 – Age, Gender and Sample Size Comparison by Treatment Group
The control and the treatment groups each contained 200 non-voters when the sample was randomly
assigned. The individuals in the control group did not receive a treatment. The sample size of the
treatment groups was reduced when postcards were returned as undeliverable.
The social pressure messages for each treatment group are below:
1

“Do your Civic Duty and vote.
This year, we're trying to figure out why people do or do not vote. We'll be
studying voter turnout in the Tuesday March 15 Presidential Primary election.
Anything we learn about your voting or non-voting will remain confidential and will
not be disclosed to anyone else.”
“Public records show that you have not voted in any election since 2010. We will
send you another postcard in May that shows whether or not you voted in the March
15, 2016 Presidential Primary Election.”
“
Public records show that you have not voted in any election since 2010. After the
March 15, 2016 Presidential Primary election, your neighbors can easily learn
whether or not you voted. Your voting history is public record.”

2 “

3

4
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The data contained in the voter file was examined to assess the comparability of the
control and treatment groups. The descriptives for female and male subjects as well as their
age across the groups are shown in Table 2. Gender breakdown was similar across the
various groups (control and treatments). Likewise, the mean age of the subjects across the
control and the treatment groups was similar. The average age of all subjects was 44 and the
average age of subjects by group varied little - ranging from 43 to 47 years of age. Thus we
can be confident that any observed effects are not the result of group incomparability as far
as age and gender are concerned.
Experimental Treatments
Dependent Variable
In this experiment the dependent variable “Voted” is whether or not a subject voted in
the 2016 Presidential Primary. It is a dichotomous nominal variable where the values are
“yes” or “no.” It is coded no = 0 and yes =1. In the Cook County voter file each election
occupies a column in the spreadsheet. For each election a “V” designates whether the
individual voted in a particular election. A “NV” is entered if an individual did not vote.
Using this list, prior to the Illinois primary in March of 2016, study participants were
sampled and assigned to a particular treatment or control group. Sixty days after the March
Presidential Primary Election, Cook County updates the voter history files. After receiving
the updated voter file, each subject’s voting history was matched and coded in this
experiment’s database. This information was utilized to determine the extent of influence
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(i.e. change in aggregate voter turnout) for each of the treatment groups compared to the
control group of non-voters.
Social Pressure Treatments
The independent variable in this experiment is “Social Pressure.” It is an ordinal
variable containing the values Control (no social pressure), T1 – Civic Duty, T2 – Hawthorne,
T3 – Self Mailing and T4 – Neighbor. The control group was not contacted during this
experiment. Non-voters in the four treatment groups received a 4x6 postcard with a brief
message encouraging each of them to vote and containing varying degrees of social pressure
(see Appendix). As a baseline comparison with social pressure treatments, the first treatment
was a civic duty mailing, which simply encouraged turn out by urging individuals to “DO
YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!”. The second treatment group received the "Hawthorne"
mailing in which voters were told "you are being studied." The Hawthorne effect5 or observer
effect is a type of reactivity6 in which individuals modify or improve an aspect of their
behavior in response to their awareness of being observed. In other words, alerting
individuals to the fact that they are being studied could lead to temporary increases in voter
turnout. The Hawthorne effect mailer intensifies the social pressure because individuals are
being drawn to the idea that they are being studied, an element that is not present in either the

5

The original research at the Hawthorne Works in Cicero, Illinois, studied the influence of lighting and work
structure changes (working hours and break times) on productivity. Originally interpreted by Elton Mayo to
mean that paying attention to overall worker needs would improve productivity, later interpretations
suggested that the novelty and increased attention of being research subjects could lead to temporary
increases in workers' productivity. This interpretation was dubbed "the Hawthorne effect."
6

Reactivity means that individuals alter their performance or behavior due to the awareness that they are
being observed.
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control group or civic duty treatment. However, the impact of social pressure is considered
limited as with Hawthorne individual voting activities would remain undisclosed. The
promise of disclosure is what distinguishes the final two treatments. The third and fourth
treatments ratchet up the degree of social pressure significantly. The third treatment group
received a mailing that stated, “Public records show that you have not voted in any election
since 2010.” Treatment 3 referenced a “self-disclosure,” meaning that each voter in this
group was informed that they would receive notification of their participation, or a voting
report card of sorts. The fourth treatment group received the same mailing as the third
treatment group in addition to being told, “Your neighbors can easily learn whether or not
you voted. Your voting history is public record.” While this is not a guarantee of disclosure,
it is designed to have the same effect. The pressure of having voting behavior discovered by
neighbors is the reason why the “Neighbor” mailing is considered the most intense social
pressure treatment utilized in this experiment.
To summarize, a sample of registered individuals who had not voted in the past ten
elections could be shown one of four things: 1. nothing at all, 2. a mailing urging them to do
their civic duty, 3. a mailing stating they are being studied, or 4. a mailing disclosing that
they had abstained from voting in any election since 2010 combined with promise of voter
history disclosure personally or to their neighbors.
Control Variables
A number of factors are identified as important predictors of voter turnout. Among
these are a variety of demographic factors such as age and gender. Age is utilized as a
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continuous variable. Gender is coded dichotomously: female = 0 and male = 1. The
competitiveness of the races on each ballot are also controlled for. Although the number of
offices and candidates appearing on each partisan primary ballot are expected to be different,
the following races appeared on both the Republican and Democrat primary ballots:
President, US Senate, Illinois Comptroller and 10th US Congress. Nine state representatives
and seven state senators represent the same area as the Cook County portion of the 10th
Congressional District resulting in nine different ballot offerings (Figure 1). For example,
one ballot within the 10th Congressional District would list the candidates running for 15th
State Senate District, on whereas a different ballot contained the contenders for the 9th State
Senate District. “Ballot” is a control variable employed that represents the potential
differences in the competitiveness across state legislative primary contests. This variable is
coded with values 1-9 and reflects the different state legislative districts in which participants
reside (Figure 1).
While we do not expect state legislative races to massively drive voter turnout,
especially given that the sample is made up of inactive voters, we control for competitiveness
in an effort to account for differences in political context. A number of academic studies have
shown the existence of ballot roll-off7 (e.g. Darcy and Schneider 1989; Vanderleeuw and
Engstrom 1987). In a study of Ohio elections, Lott (2009) found that congressional races
experienced a 50% roll-off rate and state senate races realized 33% roll-off rate in 1996
compared to the presidential race. The non-voted ballot rates for state senate races in 1992

7

Ballot roll-off is also called ballot non-completion. In other words, an individual does not vote for every race
on the ballot. Roll-off typically increases for downballot or lower profile electoral contests.
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and 2000 were about six times greater than the rate for presidential elections (Lott 2009). For
congressional races, the non-voted ballot rate ranged from two to almost five times greater
than the non-voted ballot rate for presidential elections (Lott 2009). A number of studies
provide support for the idea that downballot races do not drive turnout. It is significantly
more likely that individuals turnout to vote in higher profile elections such as for president,
US senator and governor.
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RESULTS
Figure 2 displays the aggregate turnout rate for the control group and the four
treatment groups combined. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1: registered nonvoters experiencing social pressure voted at a rate of 12.8%, a 2.3% increase over the control
group. In short, the results suggest a slight but meaningful improvement in turnout among
those exposed to any type of social pressure treatment. We now consider if the specific type
of social pressure is important for increasing voter turnout. As shown in Figure 3, the results
are somewhat mixed, with turnout exceeding that in the control group except among
Hawthorne subjects (T2).
The expectation was an increase in voter turnout as the degree of social pressure
increased with each treatment group (H2), with the greatest effect occurring among the
treatment 4 group (H3). The turnout for the control group was 10.5% while voters receiving
the “civic duty” treatment voted at a rate of approximately one percent greater. Applying the
Hawthorne effect treatment, we expected to see an even larger turnout rate than in either the
control or Treatment 1 group, but subjects in this group voted at a rate slightly less than the
control group (1.3% differential). While this result is surprising, turnout in the third and
fourth treatment groups increased as expected, outperforming the control group as well as
treatment groups 1 and 2. Turnout for the “self mailing”8 group (T3) was an impressive 16%

8

The “Self Mailing” included a promise to send a subsequent postcard notifying the voter whether he or she
voted in the 2016 primary election.
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(approximately 5.6% greater than control group) and 16.9% (approximately 6.4% greater
than control group) for the “neighbor”9 treatment (T4). In general, these aggregate results
lend support for the first and second hypotheses that expect voter turnout to increase with
social pressure and as social pressure intensifies. With the sole exception of Treatment 2,
“Hawthorne effect,” an increase in social pressure was met with an increase in voter turnout.
Finally, our results are consistent with the third hypothesis (H3) - the largest increase in voter
turnout will occur in the fourth treatment group (T4). However, since these results are
aggregate it is impossible to test the proposed relationships. Rather, the aggregate
comparisons provide a basis for identifying changes in turnout as a consequence of social
pressure.

9

The “Neighbor” treatment alerted individuals to the fact that their neighbors can easily find out if they voted
in the 2016 primary election.
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Figure 2 – Voter Turnout by Control and Aggregate Social Pressure Treatment Groups
The “Aggregate Treatment” includes the subjects from the following treatment groups:
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Figure 3 – Voter Turnout by Control and Individual Social Pressure Treatment Groups
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In Table 3 we analyze turnout for the treatment groups combined and each specific
treatment group relative to the control group. As the dependent variable is binary (vote:
yes/no), we employ a logit model to avoid violating the assumptions of OLS regression.
Specifically, a dichotomous dependent variable violates the homoscedasticity assumption of
OLS regression where logit estimates assume heteroscedasticity. OLS regression assumes a
linear relationship between variables and calculates the percent change in the dependent
variable for each one-unit change in the independent variable. Alternatively, logit regression
does not assume a linear relationship and calculates the changes in the logged odds of the
dependent variable for every one-unit change in the independent variable.
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Voted:
No (0) or Yes (1)

Model 1
Coef. (s.e.)

Model 2
Coef. (s.e.)

Model 3
Coef. (s.e.)

Model 4
Coef. (s.e.)

All Treatment Groups
Treatment 1 – Civic
Duty
Treatment 2 Hawthorne Effect

0.16 (0.07)**
---

0.15 (0.07)**
---

--0.10 (0.33)

0.07 (0.33)

---

---

-0.15 (0.34)

-0.15 (0.34)

Treatment 3 – SelfMailing
Treatment 4 Neighbor

---

---

0.49 (0.30)*

0.49 (0.31)

---

---

0.55 (0.31)*

0.52 (0.31)*

Age

-0.01 (0.01)

-.01 (0.01)

Gender

0.27 (0.20)

.26 (0.20)

Ballot - Aggregate

-0.44 (0.23)**

-0.44 (0.23)**

Constant

-2.24 (0.18)

-1.83 (0.38)

-2.14 (0.23)

-1.72 (0.41)

N = 932
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< .10; **p< .05.
Table 3 –
Logit Estimates - Influence of Social Pressure on Registered Non-Voter Turnout
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Although logged odds are difficult to interpret on their own, they show the direction
and statistical significance of the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. A positive relationship is one in which an increase in the independent variable
(intensity of the social pressure treatment) is associated with an increase in the dependent
variable (turnout). In contrast, a negative relationship is one in which an increase in the
intensity of the social pressure treatment is marked by a decrease in turnout. A logit
coefficient estimates the change in the logged odds of the dependent variable for each oneunit increase in the value of the independent variable.
Model 1 (see Table 3) provides a base logit model that estimates the effects of social
pressure in general by contrasting the voter turnout propensity of the control group to the
combined treatment groups. The relationship is positive – a moderate 0.16 effect - and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Stated differently, the effect of the combined social
pressure treatments is associated with an increase in the logged odds of the dependent
variable, voter turnout. When control variables - age, gender and ballot (an indicator
controlling for differences in competitiveness) - are added to this core model (M2), the
relationship remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The logit model in Table 3,
Model 2, indicates that social pressure has significant impact on voter turnout.
Next, we analyze the effect of the different social pressure treatments on voter turnout
compared to the control group (the reference group) in Model 3. The “civic duty” treatment
has a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship to voter turnout. The Hawthorne
treatment, while negatively associated with voter turnout, does not reach statistical
significance. In this model, both the “self mailing” and the “neighbor” treatments increase
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voter turnout and are statistically significant (p < 0.10 level). When control variables (age,
gender and ballot competitiveness) are added in Model 4, the “neighbor” treatment is the
only relationship that maintains significance (p < 0.10). The small sample size combined
with the effect of the controls slightly weaken the influence of social pressure, rendering the
relationships of the initial three treatments insignificant. With the current sample size, the
estimated social pressure effect would need to be quite large to retain statistical significance.
To determine how likely it is that an individual exposed to some degree of social
pressure will turn out, I used Model 4 to predict the probability of voting. The findings
suggest that the mean predicted probability of voting is 0.117 if a non-voter was in the
control group and did not receive a social pressure treatment. The predicted probability of
voting of a non-voter receiving the “civic duty” treatment is 0.125 and it actually decreases to
0.103 if the “Hawthorne” treatment was applied. For the final two treatments we found an
upward trend in the predictive probabilities: 0.179 for the “self mailing” (T3) group and 0.182
for the “neighbor” (T4) group.

DISCUSSION
Increasing turnout gives parties and candidates opportunities to create new coalitions
of voters. A small percentage of votes, especially in a marginal district, could strengthen a
candidate’s prospects for victory. There are fewer and fewer marginal districts and these
electoral contests are where the campaign resources in large part are focused. Congressional
leadership changes partisan hands as a result of electoral outcomes in marginal congressional
districts. Examining how social pressure works in a marginal district like the Illinois 10th
Congressional District provides insights into successful campaign strategies to secure muchneeded votes that result in electoral victories.
From a substantive perspective, the results found here are promising. This experiment
realized an approximate 6.5% increase in turnout between the control group and the
Neighbor treatment (T4) and an approximate increase of 2.3% overall. Any improvement is
encouraging and a 2% increase among the voting-eligible population equals a large share of
additional votes. In a competitive race, 2% of the vote could prove critical. Across an entire
congressional district or a state, a 2% increase in turnout could mean thousands of votes up
for grabs. In traditionally low-turn out elections such as the midterms or primaries, an
increase in voters casting ballots can have a decisive impact. The “civic duty” (T1) and “self
mailing” (T3) treatment results in this study are consistent with Gerber, Green and Larimer
(2008). These authors note a 1.8% turnout improvement in the civic duty treatment group and
an increase of 4.9% in the self mailing treatment group as compared to
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the control group. With similar results for voters and non-voters alike, political campaigns
would benefit from re-evaluating the practice of targeting or “strategically mobilizing” active
voters only. The evidence here suggests that parties would benefit from casting a larger net to
include providing political engagement incentives (by the use of social pressure) among
registered but inactive individuals. At the very least, these results are worthy of further
research.
Despite the fact that we were unable to provide unwavering support for all three
hypothesized relationships, confirming our first hypothesis and partially validating our
second are interesting. The relationship between the treatment groups and voter turnout is
encouraging (H1). At the same time, with the exception of the Hawthorne group, the findings
follow hypothesized patterns, although the Neighbor group is the only relationship that
retains statistical significance once a number of controls are included in the model.
This experiment had two significant hurdles to overcome. First, this was a primary
election and turnout is typically lower than in a general election (Hill and Kousser 2016). It is
important that the influence of social pressure be examined in a variety of contexts. Previous
research has shown that electoral institutions and political culture can alter the impact of
social pressure treatments (Murray and Matland 2014). It would stand to reason that electoral
context matters as well. This experiment was conducted in a presidential primary election.
The results found here could vary from what we might find in a presidential general election,
midterm (primary and general) elections as well as local elections. Much remains unknown
about how political context affects the influence social pressure has on non-voters.
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Second, registered non-voters are not commonly contacted and encouraged to vote. A
first contact may not be enough to motivate registered non-voters to get out to vote. If
individuals who are predisposed to vote fail to turnout in primary elections, the probability of
registered inactive voters turning out is even less likely. We must also acknowledge the
potential for reactance.10 Studies have shown that reactance (Brehm and Brehm 1981;
Matland and Murray 2013) or the boomerang effect (Ringold 2002) can occur if the message
is too forceful. Stewart and Martin (1994) found that public health messages concerning
smoking, alcohol, drugs and diet contributed to less compliance. Panagopoulos (2010)
produced data that showed that a promise to reveal compliance or non-compliance with
voting norms can negatively affect the influence of social pressure. Mann (2010) disguised
social pressure as either assistance, a survey or as research in an effort to maximize
effectiveness and minimize backlash. Softening the message did not lessen the effectiveness.
It is reasonable to conclude that reactance played a role in this experiment, especially among
the Hawthorne group participants. Based on the results found here, it would be prudent for
campaigns to avoid using a “Hawthorne” treatment, at least when non-voters are targeted.
The fact that campaign resources are generally limited and must be strategically targeted to
mobilize a sufficient number of voters, the results indicate the “Neighbor” message would be
the most productive social pressure treatment to encourage active participation.
Furthermore, the sample in this experiment was admittedly small, with a total sample
size of 1,000 or 200 participants within each experimental grouping. Although Gerber,

10

Reactance can occur when someone is heavily pressured to accept a certain view or attitude. Reactance can
cause the person to adopt or strengthen a view or attitude that is contrary to what was intended and
increases resistance to persuasion.

34

Green, and Larimer (2008) ran their experiment during the Michigan Primary Election in
2006, their sample size was 180 times larger and they targeted voters with a previous voting
history. A larger sample would reduce the distribution or variance of the logit coefficients,
giving us more confidence in the significance of the results.
We would be remiss if we did not discuss the electoral politics in the 2016
presidential race. This election was unique in that almost 11% of participants in the control
group also turned out to vote. These individuals had not participated in the last ten elections,
since at least 2010. The logical conclusion is that some factor beyond social pressure – as
individuals in the control group were not exposed to the treatment - encouraged turnout
among these registered, but consistently inactive voters. There were significant primary
battles occurring in both major parties and the nominees were not chosen until late in the
primary process. The competitiveness of the presidential primary election in both parties
arguably had a substantial impact on turnout regardless of the voter’s history. The fact that
11% of non-voters in the control groups turned out provides some evidence that electoral
context is important to the study of social pressure.
Testing the effects of social pressure in a longitudinal panel study will provide
additional insight into what types of elections and social pressure tactics registered nonvoters are most likely to respond to. Registered non-voters could require multiple contacts
and different intensities of social pressure before they respond. Non-voters may exhibit
higher levels of reactance and may need to be approached differently than individuals with a
high or moderate propensity to vote.
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We cannot evaluate voter turnout in the United States without discussing the lack of
political participation of registered non-voters. By specifically targeting inactive voters, this
experiment builds on mobilization literature that examines voter propensity and electoral
context. Sampling individuals with some propensity to vote is important to understand how
social pressure treatments mobilize voters, but it is a first step. This experiment shows that
individuals with very little or no propensity to vote can be mobilized. There is still more
work that needs to be done. However, the discovery of a statistically significant increase in
voter turnout with one initial contact is promising. Although it is not the focus of our study
we have found evidence that electoral context influences the effectiveness of social pressure.
The results from the control group support the argument that election salience and
competitiveness can influence turnout even among non-voters. Whether we can replicate
these findings in a low-turnout election has yet to be explored, but the initial results are
encouraging. In the bigger picture, greater turnout can alter traditional campaign strategies.
Once individuals begin to vote they become more visible to political campaigns and it
becomes increasingly difficult for candidates to ignore these “new” voters. In the political
world of finite resources, this forces office seekers to re-evaluate how they engage voters.
This research could have significant and far-reaching implications for candidates, voters, and
ultimately the health of our American democracy.

WORKS CITED

Arceneaux, K., Mullin, M., and Kousser, T. 2012. “Get Out the Vote by Mail: A
Randomized Experiment Testing the Effects of Mobilization in Traditional and
Vote-by-Mail Precincts.” Political Research Quarterly 65(4): 882–894.
Arceneaux, K., and Nickerson, D. W. 2009. “Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-analysis of
Eleven Randomized Field Experiments.” American Journal of Political Science
53(1): 1–16.
Bensley, L. S., and Wu, R. 1991. “The Role of Psychological Reactance in Drinking
Following Alcohol Prevention Messages.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 21:
1111–1124.
Blais, A. 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote? Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Brehm, J. W. 1966. A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York: Academic Press.
Brehm, S., and Brehm, J. W. 1981. Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and
Control.New York: Academic Press.
Campbell, A., Gurin G., and Miller W. E. 1954. The Voter Decides. Evanston, IL: Row,
Peterson.
Cardy, E. 2005. "An Experimental Field Study of the GOTV and Persuasion Effects of
Partisan Direct Mail and Phone Calls." Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 601 (September): 28-40.
Cialdini, R. B., and Goldstein, N.J. 2004. "Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity."
Annual Review of Psychology 55 (February): 591–621.
Cialdini, R. B., and Trost., M. R. 1998. "Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and
Compliance." In The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th edition, ed. Daniel T.
Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 151–92.
Cox, G. W., and Munger. M.C. 1989. “Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the
1982 U.S. House Elections.” The American Political Science Review, 83(1): 217-231.
Darcy, R., and Schneider, A. 1989. “Confusing allots, Roll-off, and the Black Vote. Western
Political Quarterly, 42(3): 347-364

Davenport, T. C. 2010. “Public Accountability and Political Participation: Effects of a
Face-to-face Feedback Intervention on Voter Turnout of Public Housing Residents.”
Political Behavior 32(3): 337–368.
Dhillon, A., and Peralta, S. 2002. “Economic Theories of Voter Turnout.” The Economic
Journal, 112(480): F332-F352.
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Enos, R. D., Fowler, A., and Vavreck, L. 2014. “Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV
Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate. Journal of Politics, 76(1): 273–
288.
Fiorina, M. P. 1989. Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. Yale University
Press.
Funk, P. 2010. “Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the Swiss Mail Ballot
System.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(5): 1077-1103.
Gerber, A S., and Green D. P. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct
Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." American Political Science Review 94
(September): 653-63.
Gerber, A. S., Green D. P., and Green, M. N. 2003. "The Effects of Partisan Direct Mail on
Voter Turnout." Electoral Studies 22 (December): 563-79.
Gerber, A. S., Green D. P., and Larimer, C.W. 2008. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout:
Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” The American Political Science
Review 102(1):33-48.
Gerber, A. S., Green D. P., and Larimer, C.W. 2010. “An Experiment Testing the Relative
Effectiveness of Encouraging Voter Participation by Inducing Feelings of Pride or
Shame.” Political Behavior32(3): 409-422.
Geys, B. 2006. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-level Research.”
Electoral Studies 25(4): 409-422.
Green, D. P., Gerber, A. S., and Nickerson, D. W. 2003. "Getting Out the Vote in Local
Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments." Journal of
Politics 65 (November): 1083-96.
Hamilton, A., and Madison, J. 2008, Federalist No. 51, in The Federalist Papers. Oxford
University Press.

38

Harbaugh, W. T. 1996. "If People Vote because they Like to, then Why do so Many of them
Lie?" Public Choice 89 (October): 63–76.
Hill, S. J., and Kousser, T. 2016. “Turning Out Unlikely Voters? A Field Experiment in the
Top-Two Primary.” Political Behavior 38(2), 413-432.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K.A., and Smith V. L. 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding
Behavior in Dictator Games." American Economic Review 86 (June): 653–60.
Huckfeldt, R., and Sprague, J. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication:
Information and Influence in an Election Campaign. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Huddy, L., and Khatib, N. 2007. “American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political
Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science 51: 63–77.
Kallgren, C. A., Reno, R. R., and Cialdini, R. B. 2000. "A Focus Theory of Normative
Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior." Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 26 (August): 1002–12.
Karp, J., and Banducci, S. 2000. “Going Postal: How All-Mail Elections Influence Turnout.”
Political Behavior 22(3): 223-239.
Larimer, C. W. 2009. “Does Election Type Have an Impact on the Effectiveness of Social
Pressure appeals to voting? Evidence from a Field Experiment.” Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. April 2-5,
2009.
Lerner, J. S., and Tetlock, P. E. 1999. "Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability." Psychological Bulletin 125 (March): 255–75.
Lott Jr, J. R. 2009. “Non-voted Ballots, the Cost of Voting, and Race. Public Choice, 138(12): 171-197.
Mann, C. B. 2010. “Is There Backlash to Social Pressure? A Large-scale Field Experiment
on Voter Mobilization”. Political Behavior 32(3): 387–407.
Matland, R. E., and Murray, G. R. 2013. “An Experimental Test for “Backlash” Against
Social Pressure Techniques Used to Mobilize Voters.” American Politics Research
41(3): 359-386.
Mayhew, D. R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press.

39

Miller, C. H., Burgoon, M., Grandpre, J. R., and Alvaro, E. M. 2006. “Identifying Principal
Risk Factors for the Initiation of Adolescent Smoking Behaviors: The Significance of
Psychological Reactance.” Health communication 19(3): 241-252.
Murray, G. R., and Matland, R. E. 2014. “Mobilization Effects Using Mail: Social Pressure,
Descriptive Norms, and Timing.” Political Research Quarterly 67(2): 304-319.
Panagopoulos, C. 2010. Emotions, Motivation and Prosocial Behavior: Field Experimental
tests of the effects of alternative civic duty appeals on voter turnout. In ISPS 40th
Anniversary Conference, November (Vol. 14).
Posner, R. A., and Rasmusen E. B. 1999. "Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special
Reference to Sanctions." International Review of Law and Economics 19
(September): 369-82.
Ramirez, R. 2005. "Giving Voice to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness
of a National Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort." Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 601 (September): 66-84.
Reich, J. W. and Robertson, J. L. 1979. “Reactance and Norm Appeal in Anti-Littering
Messages.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 9: 91–101.
Riker, W. H., and Ordershook, P. C. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." American
Political Science Review 62 (March): 25–43.
Rind, B. and Benjamin, D. 1994. "Effects of Public Image Concerns and Self-Image
on Compliance." The Journal of Social Psychology 134 (February): 19-25.
Ringold, D. J. 2002. "Boomerang Effects in Response to Public Health Interventions:
Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market." Journal of
Consumer Policy 25 (March): 27-63.
Rosenstone, S. J., and Hansen, J. M. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in
America. New York: Macmillan.
Scheff, T. J. 2000. "Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory." Sociological
Theory 18 (March): 84-99.
Schram, A., and van Winden, F. 1991. "Why People Vote. Free Riding and the Production
and Consumption of Social Pressure." Journal of Economic Psychology 12: 575-620.
Schultz, W. P. 1999. "Changing Behavior with Normative Feedback Interventions: A
Field Experiment on Curbside Re- cycling." Basic and Applied Social Psychology 21
(March): 25–36.

40

Schwenzfeier, M. 2014. “When Social Pressure Fails: Evidence from Two Direct Mail
Experiments.” Undergraduate Honors Thesis. College of William & Mary.
Shachar, R., and Nalebuff, B. 1999. “Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political
Participation.” The American Economic Review 89(3): 525-547.
Stewart, D. W., and Martin, I. M.. 1994. "Intended and Unintended Consequences of
Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research." Journal of
Public Policy and Marketing 13 (Spring): 1-19.
Uhlaner, C. 1989. “Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups.” American Journal of
Political Science 33(2): 390-422.
Vanderleeuw, J. M., and Engstrom, R. L. 1987. “Race, Referendums, and Roll-off.” The
Journal of Politics 49(4): 1081-1092.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., and Brady, H. E. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism
in American Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Whatley, M. A., Webster, J. M., Smith, R. H., and Rhodes, A. 1999. "The Effect of a Favor
on Public and Private Compliance: How Internalized is the Norm of Reciprocity."
Basic and Applied Social Psychology 21(March): 251–59.

APPENDIX
POSTCARDS

Front of Postcard

Voter Engagement Council
PO Box 91779
Elk Grove Village, IL 60009

Vote March 15th!
Joe Smith
1234 Anywhere Dr.
Lookout, IL 60000

T1 Civic Duty

DO YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!
We have a voice in government. Your voice starts with your vote.
On Tuesday March 15, remember your rights and responsibilities as a
citizen. Remember to vote.

DO YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!
To find your polling location visit:
www.cookcountyclerk.com/elections/pollinglocations
or call (312) 603-0906
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T2 Hawthorne

YOU ARE BEING STUDIED!
This year, we're trying to figure out why people do or do not vote. We'll be
studying voter turnout in the Tuesday March 15 Presidential Primary
election. Anything we learn about your voting or non-voting will remain
confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone else.

DO YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!
To find your polling location visit:
www.cookcountyclerk.com/elections/pollinglocations
or call (312) 603-0906

T3 Self-mailing

WHO VOTES IS PUBLIC INFORMATION!
Public records show that you have not voted in any election since 2010. We
will send you another postcard in May that shows whether or not you voted in
the March 15, 2016 Presidential Primary Election.

DO YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!
To find your polling location visit:
www.cookcountyclerk.com/elections/pollinglocations
or call (312) 603-0906
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T4 Neighbor

WHAT IF YOUR NEIGHBORS KNEW
WHETHER YOU VOTED?
Public records show that you have not voted in any election since 2010. After the
March 15, 2016 Presidential Primary election, your neighbors can easily learn
whether or not you voted. Your voting history is public record.

DO YOUR CIVIC DUTY AND VOTE!
To find your polling location visit:
www.cookcountyclerk.com/elections/pollinglocations
or call (312) 603-0906

